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STANDING IN THE WAY OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS—THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT
RESOLVES COURTS OF APPEALS SPLIT IN
FAVOR OF NONPARENTS
Madison Bertrand *
In In re H.S., the Supreme Court of Texas held that a nonparent has standing
to pursue a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR) even when the
child’s parents have not wholly relinquished their parental rights and
responsibilities. 1 In its holding, the court declared that granting nonparent
standing under Texas Family Code § 102.003(a)(9) “to persons ‘who have played
an unusual and significant parent-like role in a child’s life’ . . . does not
unconstitutionally interfere with parents’ fundamental liberty interest in raising
their children.” 2 The court decided to use the statutory interpretation of §
102.003(a)(9) outlined in Jasek v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services3
to reach its holding in In re H.S. 4 In favor of the Jasek interpretation, the court
used its authority to resolve the split among the Texas courts of appeals by
discounting the valid arguments of particular courts of appeals, as well as by
emphasizing the United States Supreme Court’s recognition of the “fundamental
right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children.” 5 The court erred in its holding because the fundamental right of
parents requires a parent to relinquish their parental rights under § 102.003(a)(9)
before a nonparent may assert standing.
Section 102.003(a)(9), entitled “General Standing to File Suit,” confers
standing to file a SAPCR on a “person, other than a foster parent, who had actual
care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months.” 6 Disputes
surrounding the interpretation of this statute generally hinge on what is required

* Managing Editor, SMU Law Review. Candidate for J.D. 2020, SMU Dedman School of
Law; B.S. 2014, Brigham Young University.
1. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 163 (Tex. 2018).
2. Id. (citation omitted).
3. See 348 S.W.3d 523, 535 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.).
4. 550 S.W.3d at 157.
5. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion).
6. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9).
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to have “actual control.” This was the central issue in In re H.S. 7
I. BACKGROUND
For the first twenty-three months of her life, Heather 8 lived in the home of her
maternal grandmother and step-grandfather (Grandparents). 9 Heather’s mother
(Mother) and father (Father) were Heather’s “joint managing conservators,” 10
meaning both Mother and Father shared joint custody 11—specifically,
responsibility and authority—of Heather. Mother, who was not married to Father,
periodically resided with Heather at Grandparents’ home until she moved into a
sober-living facility to treat her alcohol addiction. 12 At that time, the parties
unanimously agreed that Heather would continue to live with Grandparents while
Mother remained in the facility. 13 Mother was in the facility for six months,
during which Grandparents served as Heather’s “primary caregivers” and thus
“directed [her] day-to-day activities and took care of her daily needs; provided her
with a home, food, clothing, and shelter; . . . paid for her daycare,” and addressed
her medical needs. 14 During this time, Mother and Father remained involved in
Heather’s life: Mother saw Heather regularly, often assisting with Heather’s
nightly routine, and Heather stayed with Father about every other weekend. 15
Mother and Father also made medical decisions for Heather, authorizing doctors’
visits and medical treatments. 16 Ultimately, “Grandparents kept Mother and
Father informed about Heather’s daily activities and medical needs and ‘sought
input’ from them on decisions that needed to be made about her.” 17
Eventually, Grandparents filed a SAPCR, requesting appointment as Heather’s
managing conservators and alleging they had standing to sue as nonparents under
§ 102.003(a)(9). 18 In response, Father filed a plea seeking to dismiss
Grandparents’ petition for lack of standing, arguing that Grandparents did not
have the statutorily required “actual control” of Heather because Mother and
Father “intended the arrangement with Grandparents to be temporary . . . [and]
did not intend to relinquish . . . control of Heather to Grandparents.” 19 The trial
court granted Father’s plea and dismissed Grandparents’ petition, finding that
Grandparents did not establish the statutorily required actual control over
Heather. 20 The court of appeals affirmed, holding

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

550 S.W.3d at 156.
“Heather” is the pseudonym the courts used to refer to the child at issue. Id. at 152 n.1.
Id. at 152–53.
Id. at 153.
See id.; see also TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.016 (defining “joint managing conservatorship”).
In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 153.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted in first quotation).
Id.
Id. at 153−54.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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[S]tanding under section 102.003(a)(9) cannot be gained by a nonparent
exercising care, control, and possession over a child in the absence of
evidence that the child’s parent is unfit or has abdicated his or her own care,
control, and possession over the child to the nonparent for the statutory
period. 21
The Texas Supreme Court granted the petition for review. 22
II. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS
Upon review, the Texas Supreme Court applied the statutory interpretation
used in Jasek to declare that Grandparents had standing and remanded the case
to the trial court on the merits. 23 The Jasek Court concluded that a nonparent has
actual control under § 102.003(a)(9) when they “exercise . . . guidance, governance
and direction similar to that typically exercised on by parents with their
children,” 24 regardless of the status of the parents’ rights. 25 In adopting this
interpretation, the Texas Supreme Court stated that such a holding establishes a
“high” and “narrow” threshold for nonparent standing in Texas 26 that recognizes
the fundamental but conditional rights of parents. 27 In finding actual control in
nonparents who “play[] an unusual and significant parent-like role in a child’s
life,” the court dismissed any requirement that parents relinquish their own
parental rights, including legal authority, before nonparent standing may be
established. 28
To reach its holding, the court first had to determine the plain meaning of
actual control. In doing so, the court applied statutory interpretation principles,
presuming the legislature meant for each word of the statute to have an individual
and purposeful meaning. 29 In deciding the plain meaning of actual control, 30 the
court first addressed the issue of whether the statute required nonparents to have
legal authority over the child. In an attempt to avoid too narrow of an
interpretation, the court determined that the ordinary meaning of actual control
was explicitly separate from “legal control” or “any other language indicating that
21. In re H.S., 552 S.W.3d 282, 289 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016) (mem. op.), rev’d, 550
S.W.3d 151 (Tex. 2018).
22. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 154.
23. Id. at 163.
24. Jasek v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 348 S.W.3d 523, 533 (Tex. App.—Austin
2011, no pet.) (citing Coons-Andersen v. Andersen, 104 S.W.3d 630, 636 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003,
no pet.)).
25. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 160.
26. Compare id. at 163, with Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 61 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(holding a visitation statute permitting “[a]ny person” to petition for visitation rights “at any time”
unconstitutional).
27. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 163.
28. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1149
(Me. 2004)).
29. Id. at 155.
30. “‘Actual’ means ‘[e]xisting in fact; real[,]’ . . . [a]nd ‘control’ is commonly defined as ‘the
power or authority to manage, direct, or oversee.’” Id. at 157 (first alteration in orginal) (citations
omitted) (first quoting Actual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); and then quoting Control,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY).
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[the legislature] intended formal legal authority over the child to be a condition
for standing under subsection (a)(9).” 31 To support this determination, the court
cited Jasek’s holding that actual control is separate and distinguishable from a
“bare legal right of control.” 32 It reasoned that actual control is consistent with
making the “day-to-day decisions” associated with raising a child, such as “when
she gets up and goes to bed, how much television she watches, whether she gets
dessert, [and] when she needs to go to the doctor.” 33 Thus, actual control is
inconsistent with making only the “important” or legal decisions. 34 This
interpretation preserved separate meaning for the term “actual care”—and avoided
rendering it superfluous—because actual control requires a nonparent to make the
day-to-day decisions associated with raising a child while actual care requires the
literal accomplishment of those decisions. 35 Although the court acknowledged
that parents who maintain their parental rights have the legal authority to
supersede nonparent decisions and permission, it held this merely highlighted the
difference between actual control and legal control. 36 The court ultimately
determined that “had the Legislature intended to require [legal] authority, it
would have said so.” 37 Therefore, the court held Grandparents had standing
although Mother and Father remained Heather’s managing conservators. 38
The second issue the court determined was whether the plain meaning of actual
control required nonparents to have exclusive control of the child. In Smith v.
Hawkins, a Houston court of appeals found no exclusivity requirement in §
102.003(a)(9). 39 In this case, the Texas Supreme Court cited Smith and similarly
argued that such a condition on standing “would effectively add an exclusivity
requirement that is not reflected in the statute’s plain language.” 40 It stated that
focusing the analysis of nonparent standing on the parents’ conduct ignored the
plain terms of the statute, which do not mention parental conduct. 41 The court
again determined that the legislature would have included a requirement of “total
‘abdication’ by the parent” had that been the legislature’s intent. 42 Accordingly,
the court held Grandparents had standing even though Mother and Father had
not relinquished their parental rights and responsibilities and, to the contrary,
remained actively involved in making decisions about Heather. 43

31. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted in first quotation).
32. See id. at 156 (quoting Jasek v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 348 S.W.3d 523,
535 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.)).
33. Id. at 158.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 158−59.
37. Id. at 157.
38. Id. at 161.
39. Smith v. Hawkins, No. 01-09-00060-CV, 2010 WL 3718546, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Sept. 23, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
40. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 158 (citing Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 80–81 (Tex. 2011)).
41. Id. at 159.
42. Id. at 158.
43. Id. at 160.
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III. WHY THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT GOT IT WRONG
The Texas Supreme Court incorrectly concluded that Grandparents had actual
control—and, therefore, standing to sue. 44 By contrast, multiple Texas courts of
appeals, including the Fort Worth and Beaumont courts of appeals, have held
that for a nonparent to achieve actual control, the child’s parents must first give
up actual care, control, and possession.45 These courts reasoned that this
interpretation of § 102.003(a)(9) comports with the text of the statute and avoids
potential encroachment on the fundamental rights of parents. 46 They rely on the
notion that,
so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there
will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm
of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children. 47
Therefore, a nonparent cannot have standing unless the parent is unfit or has
relinquished his or her parental rights. 48 In In re M.J.G., the Fort Worth court of
appeals rejected the grandparents’ claim of standing in a SAPCR because there
was no evidence that the children’s parents had abdicated their parental rights to
the grandparents since the parents lived with the children in the grandparents’
home.49 The court found that although the children lived with their grandparents
and the grandparents performed “day-to-day” duties on behalf of the children, this
was insufficient to establish that the grandparents had “actual care, custody, and
control” of the children.50 Similarly, in In re K.K.C., the Beaumont court of
appeals held that a nonparent did not have standing because the parent “lived
with the child, adequately cared for the child, and did not relinquish to [the
nonparent] or abdicate her parental rights, duties, and responsibilities.” 51 In that
case, it did not matter that the nonparent spent holidays with the child,
disciplined the child, attended the child’s school functions, or provided financial
support for the child. 52 These holdings properly reflect the United States Supreme
Court’s recognition of the fundamental nature of parental rights.
Furthermore, in the case at issue, Justice Blacklock argued in dissent that the
court should “adopt the reading [of § 102.003(a)(9)] that avoids burdening
parents’ unalienable right to raise their children as they see fit.” 53 This reading
mandates that a nonparent cannot have the “actual care, control, and possession”
44. Id. at 158.
45. Id. at 171 n.2 (Blacklock, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 171, 174.
47. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68−69 (2000) (plurality opinion) (citing Reno v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993)).
48. In re H.S., 552 S.W.3d 282, 289 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016) (mem. op.), rev’d, 550
S.W.3d 151 (Tex. 2018).
49. In re M.J.G., 248 S.W.3d 753, 758–59 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).
50. Id.
51. In re K.K.C., 292 S.W.3d 788, 793 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009), abrogated by In re H.S., 550
S.W.3d 151 (Tex. 2018).
52. Id. at 791.
53. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 166 (Blacklock, J., dissenting).
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required for standing under § 102.003(a)(9) unless the child’s parent has
relinquished their parental rights. 54 Justice Blacklock noted that actual control
must mean something more than making the day-to-day decisions: “If all . . .
‘control’ means is deciding ‘when [a child] gets up and goes to bed, how much
television she watches, whether she gets dessert, [and] when she needs to go the
doctor,’ then [there is no discernable] distinction between ‘care’ and ‘control,’”
and the term “control” is thereby superfluous. 55 Moreover, Justice Blacklock
suggested the court erroneously treated actual control and legal control as
opposites. 56 He argued that actual control is fused with the parents’ legal control
until relinquished. 57 Thus, in this case, Justice Blacklock reasoned that
Grandparents seeking the approval of Mother and Father for Heather’s medical
care and regularly reporting to them about Heather’s activities “[were] not signs
of parent-like control. They [were] signs of its absence. They [were] signs that
control actually lies within the one receiving the reports about the child, not the
one making them.” 58
The court should have found—for the same reasons Justice Blacklock’s dissent
and some Texas courts of appeals did—that “[t]he best reading of the text of section
102.003(a)(9) requires a child’s parents to relinquish or shirk their ‘actual control’
of the child before a non-parent may assert the ‘actual control’ required for
standing.” 59 Moreover, the American family is changing: from 1970 through
2012, the percentage of children living in a grandparent-maintained household
doubled from 3% to 6%. 60 This increase in grandparent coresidence was primarily
attributed to increasing rates of divorce and teenage pregnancy. 61 These realities
demand an interpretation of § 102.003(a)(9) that requires parents to relinquish
actual control. Parents should be encouraged to seek out individuals who can help
provide quality care for their children without fear of compromising their parental
rights. Such a holding does not diminish the special role nonparents play in the
lives of children but instead magnifies the critical right parents have to control
their children’s upbringing, which is one of the oldest “fundamental liberty
interests recognized by [the United States Supreme Court].” 62 Therefore,
delegating day-to-day care of a child “[should] not reduce the parents’ control over
the child or [equate to] shar[ing] ‘parent-like’ control with others.” 63
Furthermore, the court’s holding has severe constitutional ramifications. Even
though the majority argued the constitutionality of its interpretation, when there
is standing, a judge having “the power to review a parent’s decisions about the
extent to which non-parents should be involved in a child’s life undermines the
54. Id.
55. Id. at 172 (first two alterations in original) (quoting id. at 158 (majority opinion)).
56. Id. at 170 (Blacklock, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 171.
58. Id. at 173.
59. Id. at 177.
60. RENEE R. ELLIS & TAVIA SIMMONS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CORESIDENT GRANDPARENTS
AND THEIR GRANDCHILDREN: 2012, at 3 (2014).
61. Id. at 3–4.
62. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion).
63. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 170.
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parents’ role as the ultimate decision-makers for their child.” 64 It is clear the
United States Supreme Court intended to avoid just this: “[T]he Due Process
Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to
make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’
decision could be made.” 65 The risk of exposing parents to litigation over the
parent-child relationship is incredibly detrimental. Such litigation not only
disempowers parents but also devastates important, often familial relationships. 66
Also, the legal system generally lacks the specialized training to deal with such
complex and challenging issues, instead relying largely on the vague “best interests
standard” to determine intimate familial matters. 67 For “fit parents, true control
of their children is an illusion if the courts really get to make the final call.” 68
IV. CONCLUSION
The Texas Supreme Court erred in its holding by broadly interpreting the term
“actual control,” thereby burdening parents who have not relinquished their
fundamental parental rights and responsibilities. In a country that has recognized
the fundamental right of parents to “bring up [their] children” since 1923,69 the
court should have erred on the side of caution to recognize that it is “cardinal . .
. that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder.” 70 There still exists a fundamental right of parents:
because they did not relinquish their rights—and, to the contrary, remained
devoted to Heather—Mother and Father alone deserve the right to ultimately
make decisions about Heather’s future.

64. Id. at 177.
65. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72−73.
66. Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In the Best Interests of Children: A Proposal to Transform
the Adversarial System, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 203, 204 (2004).
67. Id. at 206.
68. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 177.
69. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
70. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).

